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CROFT & REED, INC., 
Defendant -Counterclaimant -Respondents 
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COUNTY 
Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Croft & Reed, Inc. 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
STEEL FARMS, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CROFT & REED, INC., 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-08-7912 
CROFT & REED, INC.'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
------------------------------~ CROFT & REED, INC. 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
STEEL FARMS, INC.; DOUG STEEL, 
individually; and KEVIN STEEL, 
individually, 
Counterdefendants. 
DefendantiCounterclaimant, Croft & Reed, Inc. (Croft & Reed), by and through 
counsel of record, Beard S1. Clair Gaffney P A, submits the following memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is supported by the 
affidavits of counsel, Nathan M. Olsen, Virginia R. Mathews, and Russell J. Mathews 
filed herewith. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff, Steel Farms, Inc. (Steel Farms), has filed a complaint to enforce an 
option to purchase (Option) Croft & Reed's real property located in Bonneville County. 
A 2004 four-year written lease agreement (Lease) between the parties purports to contain 
an enforceable purchase Option. However, Steel Farms is prevented from exercising the 
Option for any of the following reasons: 
1) The Lease only allows exercise of the Option during the period of the 
lease or any "extension" of the lease. The Option cannot occur during a 
"holdover" period. The Lease expired on March 1, 2008, and was never extended. 
Steel Farms was therefore unable to exercise the Option after March 1,2008. The 
clear language of the Lease prevents exercise of the Option during the initial 
period of the lease essentially makes the Option illusory unless and until the lease 
would be extended. 
2) The Lease strictly and broadly prevents Steel Farms from selling, 
assigning or encumbering its interest under the Lease without the written consent 
of Croft & Reed, the violation of which voids the Option. This provision of the 
Lease was violated when Steel Farms entered into a written option agreement 
with a third party to purchase Croft & Reeds property without Croft & Reed's 
written consent. 
3) Even if the Option is valid, Steel Farms is also prohibited from exercising 
the Option because they are in default under the Lease, having violated the law. 
The 2004 Lease and Option was drafted by Steel Farms' attorney and negotiated 
with Croft and Reed's president Richard "Dick" Reed six days before his death in April 
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of2004. As construed against the drafter, the Option could not be exercised without an 
extension to the lease. The agreement cannot be reformed because the principal parties 
for Croft & Reed are no longer alive and therefore any alleged mistakes and/or the intent 
behind the terms of the agreement cannot ever be known or proven with clear and 
convincing evidence. The Option portion of the contract is therefore invalid and Croft & 
Reed's motion should be granted. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
Generally 
On or about April 22, 2004, Croft & Reed entered into a four year written Lease 
with Steel Farms for agricultural land owned by Croft &Reed and farmed by Steel Farms 
approximately 10 miles west ofldaho Falls, Idaho on HWY 20. (V. Mathews Aff.,[ 6, 
Ex. B) The lease was drafted by Steel Farms attorney, Greg Ehardt. (Cite) Croft & 
Reed's president and stockholder, Dick Reed, died six days after signing the agreement. 
(ld. at ~ 4). Croft & Reed's other stockholder at that time, Velma Reed, passed away on 
November 1,2007. (Id. at ~ 5). Croft & Reed alleges that certain errors in the Lease 
invalidates an option to purchase provision found in the agreement because of a lack of 
the "meeting of the minds" or a failure to meet the writing requirements ofldaho's 
Statute of Frauds. (See Defendant's and Counterclaimant's Answer and Counterclaims). 
Croft & Reed also believes that parties involved in the 2004 transaction may have lacked 
proper capacity to bind Croft & Reed to the Lease. (Id.) However, for the purpose of 
this summary judgment motion only, Croft & Reed will assume Steel Farm's position 
that the Lease is a valid and binding agreement between the parties is legally correct 
1. Holdover and Option Terms of the Lease 
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The Lease indicates that the term and possession of the Lease commenced on the 
effective date ofthe agreement, April 22, 2004, and ended on the 1st day of March, 2008. 
(V. Mathews Aff. ~ 6, Ex. B. Lease Sec. 3.l). The agreement further states that rent 
during the term (or any holdover) shall be $40,000 per year. (Jd. at Sec. 4.1 of Lease. See 
also Olsen AfT. Ex. A "Modified Lease" at Sec. 4.1). The first page of the Lease consists 
of a summary of certain lease provisions. (Jd. Page 1 of Lease and Modified Lease). The 
lease term is stated as four years. (Jd.) Steel Farms has judicially admitted the four year 
term of the Lease in its verified complaint. (See Complt. ~~6, 8) 
Section 19 of the Lease consists of a provision purporting to grant Steel Farms an 
option to purchase the premises upon certain temlS and conditions. (V. Mathews Aff. 
Ex. B at Sec. 19 of Lease. See also Olsen Aff. Ex. A "Modified Lease" at Sec. 19). 
Section 19.9.1. of the Lease requires that to exercise the option, Steel Farms must give 
written notice to exercise the option to Croft & Reed: 
[.SJubsequent to the maturity of this option on July 15,2008, and during the Term 
of this lease (including any agreed extension or exercised option term but 
excluding any holdover term). 
*** 
Any attempt to exercise the Option that does not strictly comply with this 
paragraph is void and does not constitute an effective exercise (of) the option. 
(Jd.) (emphasis added) 
As the Lease was written and signed in 2004, the Option could not be exercised 
during the period of the Lease. In order for the Option to be validly exercised, the parties 
would have been required to extend the Lease in such manner as prescribed under the 
Lease and under the appropriate authority prescribed under Croft & Reed's bylaws. 
Section 2004 of the Lease provides that the agreement may be: 
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[A ]altered, amended or revoked only by an instrument in writing signed by both 
(Croft & Reed) and (Steel Farms.) 
(ld. at Sec. 20.4). 
On December 28, 1961, Croft & Reed approved bylaws for the management of 
the corporation. (V. Mathews Aff. Ex. B.) These bylaws were in effect in November of 
2007. (V. Mathews AfT. ~ 9) Article III, Section 1 of these bylaws requires the President 
to approve all corporate "contracts and instruments" in writing which must have been 
"first approved by the Board of Directors." (ld. Ex B.) Article VI of the bylaws provides 
that "no contract by any officer of the company shall be valid without the previous 
authorization or subsequent ratification of the President of the Board of Directors." (ld.) 
The Lease was never extended according to either Section 19.19.1 of the Lease or 
Croft & Reed's by laws. Certain notations that were made on the Lease in approximately 
April 2006 were not made in accordance with the provisions of the Lease nor Croft & 
Reed's bylaws and were therefore insufficient to modify or extend the Lease. 
The Lease contains the following provision in Section 20.11 in regard to 
holdovers: 
If (Steel Farms) remains in possession of all or any part of the Premises after the 
expiration of the term hereof, with or without the express or implied consent of 
(Croft & Reed), such tenancy shall be from month to month only, and not a 
renewal hereof or an extension for any further term, and in such case rent, 
including percentage rent and other monetary sums due hereunder, shall be 
payable in the amount and at the time specified in this Lease and such month 
tenancy shall be subject to every other term, covenant and agreement contained 
herein. (ld. at Sec. 20.11) (emphasis added) 
2. Unauthorized encumbrance of interests 
The Lease contains the following provision in Section 19.13 with regard to the 
assignment or transfer of the Option: 
Assignment or Transfer prohibited. (Steel Farms) shall not sell or contract to sell 
or assign or contract to assign or otherwise transfer or hypothecate or assign as 
security or pledge or otherwise encumber (Steel Farm's) interest in the Option or 
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the Premises or any part thereof separate from this lease without first obtaining 
the written consent of Croft & Reed. (Id. at Sec. 19.13) 
In direct violation of this provision, Steel Farms entered into a written "Option to 
Purchase Real Property" agreement with Walker Land & Cattle, LLC (Walker Land) on 
or about April 6th 2006. (A vondet Dec. 2009 Aff. Ex. A) This agreement provides an 
option to Walker Land to purchase Croft & Reed's property "prior to the expiration" of 
Steel Farms' lease with Croft & Reed. (Id. at "Recitals") Under the terms of the 
agreement, Walker Land agreed to pay Steel Farms $832,830 "upon the exercise of the 
option and at such time as (Steel Farms) shall own fee simple title to the Property." (Jd. at 
Sec. 4) The agreement is signed by representatives from Steel Farms and Walker Land, 
but not Croft & Reed. In fact, Croft & Reed was not aware that the written agreement 
existed until it was provided in written discovery after Steel Farms filed its lawsuit in 
January of 2009. 1 
3. Sublease 
On or about April 3, 2006, Steel Farms entered into a written sublease (Sublease) 
with Walker Land & Cattle, LLC (Walker Land) in regard to the property that is subject 
to the Lease. (Jd. at 9). This agreement was sent at Venna Reed's request by Steel Farms 
to Croft & Reed's attorney for review and was signed by the parties on April 3, 2006. 
(Jd.) The Sublease allowed Walker Land to take over operations of the property subject 
to the provisions of the Sublease and the Lease. (Id. At Ex. C Sec. 1 of Sublease). The 
Sublease further provides that Walker Farms "shall not take any action which shall 
constitute a default or violation of the terms and provisions of the Lease." !d. The term of 
the Sublease was from February 15,2006 through February 14,2007. The agreement 
I It is now clear that the genesis of this lawsuit seeking specific perfonnance is the agreement between 
Steel Fanns and Walker Fanns. 
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allows for two additional one year extensions of the Sublease. (ld. at Sec. 3 of Sublease). 
The Sublease further provides that: "It is understood and agreed that (Walker Farms) is 
subleasing the premises hereinafter described from (Steel Farms) as a sublessee subject to 
the terms and provisions (~f the Lease.") (emphasis added) (ld. at Sec. 1 of the 
Sublease.) Section 2 of the Sublease states the following: 
It is specifically understood and agreed that Sublessee (Walker Farms) shall not 
acquire any greater rights in the Premises than that which is held by Sublessor 
(Steel Farms) pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Lease. (emphasis 
added.) (ld.). 
4. Lawful and Environmental use Reguirements 
The Lease contains the following terms and conditions in regard to the use of the 
property: 
a. Page 1 of the Lease indicates the tenant's use of the property as "any lawful 
purpose." 
b. 7.3.1. of the Lease requires the tenant to keep the property in "a clean and 
wholesome condition, free of any objectionable noises, odors or nuisances. 
c. 7.3.3. of the Lease prohibits the tenant from "doing" or "permitting" the 
property being used "for any unlaw fit! or objectionable purposes" or "commit or 
stiffer to be committed any waste in or upon the premises." 
d. 7.3.4. of the Lease provides that the tenant "not use the Premises or permit 
anything to be done in or about the premises which will in any way conflict with 
any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule or regulation or requirement of 
duly constituted public authorities now in force or which may hereafter be enacted 
or promulgated." The section further provides that "tenant at its sole cost and 
expense shall promptly comply with all laws, statutes, ordinances and 
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governmental rules, regulations or requirements now in force or which may 
hereafter be in force." 
(V. Mathews aff. Ex. B "Lease"; see also Olsen Aff. Ex. A. "Modified Lease). 
5. Default Provisions of Lease 
The Lease provides the following relevant provisions constituting "material 
default" by the tenant: 
a. 17.1.2. The repudiation ofthis Lease by Tenant, any action by Tenant which 
renders performance by Tenant of its obligations under this lease impossible, or 
any action by Tenant which demonstrates an intent by Tenant not to perform an 
obligation under this lease or not to continue with the peliormance of obligations 
under this lease. (Emphasis added). 
b. 17.1.4. A failure by Tenant to observe and perform any other provision of this 
lease to be observed or performed by Tenant or any provision of the obligations to 
be observed or performed by tenant, where such failure continues for thirty (30) 
days after written notice thereof by landlord to tenant. 
c. As a remedy to the default, Croft & Reed is entitled to "terminate tenant's right 
to possession" of the property and to recover damages for the tenant's default. 
(17.3.1. and 17.3.2). 
d. In regard to the Option, the Lease indicates in Section 19.9.4 that Steel Farm's 
right to exercise such option is "suspended' and that Steel Farms "shall not have 
the right to exercise the Option while (Steel Farms) is in default in performing any 
of the provisions of this lease to be performed by (Steel Farms) whether or not a 
notice of default has been served by the (Croft & Reed) spec(fying such defaults." 
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This section further states that Steel Farm's "right to exercise the Option is 
cancelled in the event qlthe termination qlthe cancellation o/the term as herein 
provided." 
rd. (emphasis added.). 
6. Lease Violations 
On or about November 25, 2008, and again on December 6, 2008, Croft & Reed 
conducted an inspection of the leased property and discovered several major violations of 
the Lease. (V. Mathews Aff. ~'! 16-20; R. Mathews Aff. ~~ 4-10). Croft & Reed agents 
discovered and photographed a man-made pit where solid waste was being deposited. In 
the pit were various trash items, including used drums, fuel containers and piping. (Id.) 
Croft & Reed also discovered and photographed several containers that were overflowing 
with used oil. (Id.) Croft & Reed also found and photographed a water pump that was 
leaking oil and other hazardous materials into the ground. (Id.) Croft & Reed also 
observed that several of the facilities on the property belonging to Croft & Reed were 
neglected and in disrepair. (Id.) It was apparent to Croft & Reed that these activities by 
their nature had been occurring for quite a while, and perhaps through much of the term 
of the lease. (Id.) After internally discussing these activities and reviewing the provisions 
of the Lease, Croft & Reed subsequently sent Steel Farms a "Notice of Termination of 
Lease" dated December 29,2008, citing such defaults, and sent the same notice to 
Walker Land on January 13,2009. (Id. Olsen Aff. Ex. B). 
Croft & Reed's attorney, Nathan Olsen, sent a letter dated December 29,2008, to 
counsel for Steel Farms informing them of these material defaults and that Steel Farms 
was therefore prohibited from exercising the option pursuant to 19.9.4 of the Lease. (Id. 
Ex. C). Olsen urged Steel Farms to remove a "Notice of Option" that had been recorded 
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in Bonneville County by Steel Farms on December 3,2008, which was in effect 
preventing Croft & Reed from marketing the property for sale. (Olsen Aft'. Ex. C). 
Notwithstanding their full awareness of their default under the Lease, Steel Farms did not 
remove the Notice of Option, and instead proceeded with the underlying legal action 
against Croft & Reed, which has further clouded the title to the property and prevented 
Croft & Reed from marketing or even leasing the property. (V. Mathews AfT. ~ 21). 
Croft & Reed has conducted follow up inspections of the property. Neither Steel 
Farms nor Walker Farms took any action to address any of the defaults within 30 days of 
receiving notice of the default. (V. Mathews Aft'. ~'l 16-20; R. Mathews Aft'. ~~ 4-10). 
Croft & Reed also inspected the property on April 24, 2009, (R. Mathews Aff. ~ 
10.) Several canisters were found strewn about the premises. (Id.) Upon closer 
examination, Croft & Reed noticed that the canisters were a highly toxic and hazardous 
pesticide substance called "Fumitoxin." The label on the canister contains several strict 
warnings about the hazardous nature and proper storage of the toxin, including the 
possibility of serious injury or death if such warnings are not strictly adhered to. (Id.) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving pmiy is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." JOAHOR. ClY. P. 56(c); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 
516-17 (Idaho 1991). It is recognized that when assessing the motion for summary 
judgment, the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
G & A! Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School 
Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874 (Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 
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Idaho 463 (Idaho 1992). 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89 (Idaho 1994). The non-moving party 
must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the 
moving party's motion. Olsen v . .fA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) 
(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 
102 (Idaho 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Lease should be enforced as written. 
Croft & Reed's legal basis for its motion is the basic legal doctrine that valid 
contracts should be enforced as written. Contracts create a "legal duty in the promisor" 
and a "right in the promise" which therefore provides a "right to enforce the contract." 
Steiner Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002), 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986). 
Furthermore, in the basic tenets of contract law, it is established that contract 
language "should be interpreted most strongly against the drafting party." Morgan v. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976 (l948). In addition, "a 
contract will be construed most strongly against the party whose attorney drew or 
prepared it." Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 387 P.2d 366 (l963). Thus, since 
Steel Farms employed its own attorney to draft the lease document, it should be 
construed most strongly against Steel Fanl1s, including provisions that might nullify and 
invalidate certain parts of the contract. 
II. Steel Farms is expressly prohibited from exercising the option during 
a holdover period. 
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A. The Lease term was four years. 
The Lease which was set to expire on March 1, 2008, was never extended, 
therefore disallowing Steel Farms from exercising the option. The Lease signed in 2004 
between Croft & Reed and Steel Farms was clearly and unambiguously set to expire on 
March 1, of2008. The date of the term in the type written agreement is stated as being 
from the effective date of the agreement, April 22, 2004, to March 1, 2008. (See Sec. 3.1 
of Lease). The term of the lease was further affirmed on the summary page of the 
agreement which is stated as "four years." (Page 1 of Lease). 
Moreover, Steel Farms admitted in its verified complaint that the tenn of the 
Lease was four years. (See Steel Farms Cmplt. ~~ 6 and 8) Statements made in a verified 
complaint are judicial admissions of acts conclusively established and admissible in 
evidence, Swanson v. State of Idaho, 83 Idaho 126, 129; 358 P.2d 387,288 (1960) The 
pleadings may be relied upon by the court for purposes of summary judgment. Esser 
Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc. Idaho Supreme Court Slip Opinion 
May 15, 2008 ID - 1 w080516124. The combination of Steel Farms' admission, as 
concurred by Croft & Reed makes it is undisputable that the parties entered into nothing 
more than a four year lease. 
Of further note, Steel Farms' verified complaint is dated December 22,2008. The 
alleged Lease with certain notations made by Kevin Steel and Virginia Mathews in April 
2006 is also attached and incorporated with the Complaint. Thus, from the outset of this 
case, notwithstanding any hand written notations or modifications to the Lease, Steel 
Farms has admitted that the Lease was four years - ending in March of2008, not 2009. 
B. The Lease anticipates a holdover period and prevents Steel Farms 
from exercising the option during the holdover period. 
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The Lease anticipates the distinct possibility of a holdover period indicating that 
the annual rent during the term of the agreement ar any haldover to be $40,000. (Sec. 3.1 
Of Lease) The contract also defines what constitutes holdover - as when the tenant (Steel 
Fan11s) "remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of the term ... with ar 
.vithaut the express or implied consent af the landlord (Croft & Reed). (Sec. 20.11 of 
Lease). This provision further makes clear that such a consent shall not be construed as a 
"renewal or an extensianfar anyfurther term." (Id.) 
The Lease strictly prohibits Steel Farms from exercising an option to buy the 
property during a holdover period. The agreement only allows Steel Farms to exercise 
the option during the term of the lease or any extension of the lease, and specifically 
states that this opportunity is excluded during any holdover term. (Sec. 19.9.1 of Lease). 
At no point have the parties agreed to an extension of the Lease beyond March 1, 2008. 
Croft & Reed may have allowed Steel Fanns to remain on the property after March 1, 
2008, but such express or implied consent does not amount to an extension of the tenn. 
C. The Lease has never been extended thus preventing Steel Farms from 
exercising the Option. 
Pursuant to Section 2004 of the Lease, any alterations to the agreement can only 
occur in a separate "instrument in writing" signed by the parties. In addition, Croft & 
Reeds bylaws during the relevant periods required that an "instruments" or "contracts" 
regarding the corporation must be approved in writing by Croft & Reed's president and 
the board. In Idaho, corporate bylaws provide the rules and designated authority to bind 
and protect the interests of the corporation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-841 (2008) 
Thus, according to Section 2004 of the Lease, Croft & Reed's bylaws, and Idaho 
law any scribbled modifications made by Virginia Mathews and Kevin Steel in April of 
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2006 were not valid. Moreover, Virginia Mathews was not an authorized director or 
agent for Croft & Reed with signature authority at the time the notations were made. Her 
mother, Venna Reed, was at that time still living and the sole Director and President of 
corporation? Kevin Steel's perception or interpretation of what he thought Virginia 
Mathew's authority was does not change the requirements and protections provided 
under Section 20.4 of the Lease, Croft & Reed's bylaws and Idaho statute as to what was 
necessary for a modification to the Lease. 
As according to the written contract, the period after March 1, 2008, in which 
Steel Farms occupied the property, can only be construed as a holdover period. Steel 
Farms is expressly forbidden by Section 19.9.1 of the Lease to exercise the option during 
the holdover period. The Court has a duty to enforce the contract as written. Steiner 
Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002), World Wide 
Lease. Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986). There is no material dispute 
over whether the Lease was extended pursuant to the requirements of Section 20.4 of the 
lease and therefore Croft & Reed's motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (Idaho 1988). 
D. Steel Farm's Sublease with Walker Land is not an extension of the 
lease. 
Steel Farms cannot argue that the 2006 Sublease between Steel Farms and Walker 
Land was an extension of the Lease term. Although the Sublease allows Walker Land an 
2 During the same month (April 2006) that Virginia Mathews and Kevin Steel made the hand written 
notations to the Lease, Venna Reed - the actual authorized representative for Croft & Reed - signed and 
notarized the Sublease with Walker Land and Steel Farms. Thus, Steel Farms was perfectly aware that 
Venna was available and the authorized person to sign documents. 
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option to extend their sublease through March 1,2009, Section 1 of the Sublease states 
that the sublease it is subject to the Lease. 
The Sublease does not expressly absolve Steel Farms from any of their 
obligations under the Lease. Nor does the Sublease alter any provisions found in the 
Lease, including expressly extending the term of the Lease. In fact, the Sublease 
expressly provides that: "It is understood and agreed that (Walker Farms) is subleasing 
the premises hereinafter described from (Steel Farms) as a sublessee subject to the terms 
and provisions of the Lease.") (Sec. 1 of the Sublease.) 
Moreover, the Sublease specifically limits the rights of Sublease to the rights held 
in the Lease, in declaring that: 
It is specifically understood and agreed that Sublessee (Steel Farms) shall not 
acquire any greater rights in the Premises than that which is held by Sublessor 
(Steel Farms) pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Lease. (emphasis 
added.) 
(Id at Sec. 2.) 
Although Croft & Reed acknowledged the Sublease, the Sublease only deals with 
rights and obligations belonging to Steel Farms, not Croft & Reed. Croft & Reed's rights 
and obligations are preserved in the Lease, and Steel Farms cannot contract Croft & 
Reed's rights and obligations away. Any interpretation of the Sublease that would 
interfere with or alter Croft & Reed's rights under the Lease would be invalid. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the Sublease, there was still no extension of the Lease and no right for 
Steel Farms to exercise the option. 
E. The parties merely agreed to a lease with an option to purchase that could 
only occur if the lease term was extended, a purpose that Steel Farms must 
accept and the Court must enforce. 
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"The court's objective in constructing a contract is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the parties." George v. University of Idaho , 121 Idaho 30, 35, 822 P. 2d 
549,554 eCt. App. 1991). "If the contract is clear and unambiguous, the court gives 
effect to the language employed according to its ordinary meaning." Dille v. Doerr 
Distributing Co., 125 Idaho 123, 125 eCt. App. 1993). In construing unambiguous terms 
of a contract, the court ascertains the parties' intent from the language contained in the 
contract. George, 121 Idaho at 35. The Lease, as agreed in writing by the parties, simply 
did not allow Steel Farms to exercise the Option unless the term of the lease was 
extended. In effect, the Lease was nothing more than a four your lease with an option to 
purchase that could only occur if Croft & Reed agreed in writing to extend the lease. 
Moreover, because Steel Farms attorney drafted the Lease, its terms must be 
construed most strongly against Steel Farms. Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 
387 P.2d 366 (1963). As the drafter of the agreement, Steel Farms and its attorney have 
the ultimate control and bargaining power to draft the document to their advantage. They 
must therefore bear the burden for any provisions in the contract that may in the end as 
written cannot be construed as they had intended. In essence, Steel Farms and/or its 
attorney must suffer the consequences for any alleged errors they made in a contract they 
drafted, not Croft & Reed. 
It would also be inappropriate for Steel Farms to urge the Court to alter the 
contract, particularly since it has admitted to the Court that the lease term was four years, 
a fact that is now indisputable. Further, "for over 100 years, the (Idaho) supreme court 
has held that a contract for the sale of real property must speak for itself and that a court 
may not admit parol evidence to supply any terms of the contract." Ray v. Frasure, 145 
Idaho 625, 628; 200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2009). The Lease itself disallows parol evidence 
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to interpret the agreement. (Sec. 2004) In essence, the Lease (with its Option or purchase 
contract) speaks for itselt~ and the Court must enforce the agreement as it is written. 
In addition, Steel Farms cannot make the extraordinary request that the 
agreement be modified because of "mutual mistake." Again, the parties have already 
mutually agreed that the lease was four years. In any case, Steel Farms bears the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the mistake was made by both parties. 
O'Connor v. Harger Comdr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846,851 (2008). This is 
simply an impossible task for Steel Farms because the original persons involved with the 
contract for Croft & Reed, Dick and Venna Reed are deceased and not available to 
testify. 
It is entirely conceivable that Dick Reed's intent was to establish a lease only, 
with the possibility of an option to purchase in the event that the lease was extended. 
This would have 1) assured that an annual income stream would continue to support his 
widow Venna after Dick's death, but yet 2) empowered Croft & Reed to ultimately 
detennine whether Steel Farms could exercise the Option by granting Steel Farms an 
extension on the lease. In the end, it does not matter. Dick and Venna's intent 
accompanied them to the grave. The only reliable evidence in regard to alleged mistakes 
or intent that remains is the written agreement, which speaks for itself, and which bars 
Steel Farms from exercising the Option because the lease was never extended. Croft & 
Reed's motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
III. Steel Farm's violation of the assignment or transfer prohibitions of its 
interests voids the Option. 
Regardless of whether the Lease was ever extended, the Lease explicitly and 
broadly prevents Steel Farms from transferring or burdening its interests under the Lease 
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or Option. Steel Farms agreed under Section 19.13 of the Lease that it would not "sell or 
contract to sell or assign or contract to assign or otherwise transfer or hypothecate or 
assign as security or pledge or otherwise encumber (Steel Farms') interest in the Option 
or the Premises or any part thereof separate from this lease without first obtaining the 
written consent of (Croft & Reed.)" The violation of this provision results in the 
immediate termination of the Option. (Id.) 
Steel Farms clearly breached this provision on April 18th of 2006, when it entered 
into an "Option to Purchase Real Property" (Walker Option) with Walker Land. Pursuant 
to Steel Farms' interest provided in its Option with Croft & Reed, the Walker Option 
commits Steel Farms to sell the leased property to Walker Land for $832,830. The 
Walker Option was signed by both Steel Farms and Walker Land, but not Croft & Reed? 
By entering into this contract with Walker Land, Steel Farms encumbered both its interest 
in the Option and the property in direct violation of Section 19.13 of the Lease. The 
consequence - as agreed to by the parties in the written agreement - is the immediate 
termination of the Option. The Court should enforce the contract by nullifYing the 
Option. Steiner Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 
2002), World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986) 
IV. Steel Farm's Lease default has cancelled the right to an option and 
has damaged Croft & Reed. 
3 It should be disconcerting to the Court about how the various transactions were conducted by Steel Fam1s 
in April, 2006. Steel Farms attempted to have the Lease modified by handwritten initials in the front 
hallway of Virginia Mathews home, notwithstanding the fact that Venn a Reed was available and had 
undergone the formal process of the legal review and notarized signing of the Sublease with Walker 
Land. Steel Farms then entered into a separate formal and fully notarized agreement with Walker Land 
to encumber its interests in the Option, without any notice or signed authorization from either Venna 
Reed or Virginia Mathews. This conduct suggests the distinct possibility that Steel Farms was aware of 
and was intentionally subverting the restrictions and authorization requirements of the Lease for its own 
gain and to the detriment of Croft & Reed. Steel Farms' improprieties should not be rewarded. 
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Whether or not the Lease was extended beyond March 1,2008, Steel Farms 
defaulted on the Lease by permitting unlawful acts on the property. The Lease's 
holdover provision provides that notwithstanding a holdover period, "such tenancy shall 
be subject to every other term, covenant and agreement contained herein." (Sec. 20.11 of 
Lease). On November 25,2008 and December 62008, Croft & Reed inspected the 
property being leased by Steel Farms and discovered several violations of the Lease. 
A. Unlawful environmental actions and conditions found on the 
property. 
Steel Fanns permitted several violations of U.S. and Idaho laws in regard to the 
storage and management of waste and hazardous materials. I.C. 31-4410 prohibits the 
"throwing away, dumping, discarding, any type or nature of solid waste" on the "private 
land of another." I.C. 31-4410 A violation of this law subjects the otlending person to 
civil and even criminal penalties. Id. "Solid waste" under Idaho statute includes any 
"discarded material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material 
resulting f1:om industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations and from 
community activities ... "I.C. 31-4401 (50). 
Croft & Reed clearly found solid waste dumped or discarded on their property in 
violation ofI.C. 31-4401. As evidenced by the photographs taken of the property, 
various types of waste and perhaps hazardous waste were deposited in a man-made pit. 
This waste included used drums, fuel containers, pipes and furniture. These wastes were 
the result of commercial and/or agricultural activities on the property, and were either 
caused or permitted by the tenant Steel Farms. These violations are serious, and warrant 
possible civil and criminal consequences. 
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There are also strict requirements imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and enforced by the State ofIdaho in regard to the storage and use of oil 
and fuel. Part 112 of the EPA's regulations on the protecting the environment and water 
pollution contains provision in regard to oil pollution prevention. 40 CFR 112.1 et al. 
Part 112.7 of those regulations contains general regulations for oil "spill prevention, 
control, and countermeasure plans." Id. Part 279 of these regulations contain 
requirements for the "management of used oil." 40 CFR 279.1 et al. .. 
The EPA's environmental regulations as well as additional Idaho regulations are 
implemented by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) through the 
"Environmental Protection and Health Act" (EHPA) I.C. 39-117, et aI... and the 
Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA) I.C. 39-4415 et al ... These Acts provide 
DEQ with the authority to monitor and enforce both civil and criminal penalties for 
activities which violate environmental protection laws or threatens the environment. Id. 
One ofDEQ's "basic environmental regulations" is the storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste and used oil. See, "Basic Environmental Regulations: What Every 
Facility Needs to Know" published by the Idaho DEQ, and found on 
www.deq.idaho.gov. lists DEQ's relevant prohibited activities and/or requirements for 
these hazardous agents are as follows (See Olsen Aff. Ex. D): 
1. Hazardous materials must be stored and disposed of properly. 
2. Disposal of hazardous waste by burning, spilling on or burying in the 
ground or by evaporation is prohibited. 
3. Storage containers must be in good condition and properly labeled, with 
lids closed, and open to inspection from all sides. 
Croft & Reed, Inco's Memorandum in Support,RWts Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 
~ ~\J Page 20 
4. Used oil must be stored only in tanks or containers that are in good 
condition and do not leak. 
5. "Used Oil" must be clearly marked and visible on all above-ground 
storage tanks, containers, and fill pipes for underground tanks. 
6. Disposal of used oil in a surface impoundment such as a ditch, pond or 
low spot is prohibited. 
7. All releases or spills of used oil must be cleaned up within 24 hours. Id. 
It appears that all of these environmental requirements were violated. As 
evidenced by Croft & Reed's observations and photographs of the site, used oil was 
stored in containers what were in poor condition and were leaking. This oil was not 
clearly marked. It appears that some oil was disposed in a low spot (the pit). The spilled 
oil was not cleaned up within 24 hours. It is also apparent from the photographs taken by 
Croft & Reed that hazardous waste, i.e. fuel and other fluids, were allowed to spill onto 
the ground from the water pump. 
B. Steel Farms' material breaches and default of the Lease. 
Both the open garbage dump and the oil and hazardous waste violations were 
clear violations of the law and therefore violations of the Lease. Steel Farms failed to 
keep the property in a "clean and wholesome condition" as required by Section 7.3.1. of 
the Lease. Moreover, Steel Farms permitted the property from being used "for any 
unlawful or objectionable purpose, and "suffered to be committed" waste on the property 
in violation of7.3.3. of the Lease. Moreover, Steel Farms permitted activities on the 
property which conflicted with the laws, statutes, and or governmental regUlations. (Sec. 
7.3.4 of Lease). 
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These defaults essentially made performance by Steel Farms of its obligations 
impossible or are a clear demonstration of intent by Steel Farms not to perform or 
continue in the performance of their obligations under the Lease. (Sec. 17.1.2 of Lease). 
This warranted an immediate termination of the Lease by Croft & Reed. Nevertheless, 
after receiving notice of these violations on December 29,2008, Steel Farms failed to 
take any action to remedy these violations, thus terminating the Lease pursuant to Section 
17.1.3. 
C. The termination and default under the Lease cancels Steel Farm's 
right to the option. 
Pursuant to 19.9.4 of the Lease, Steel Farms is prohibited from exercising the 
option when the lease is terminated. The lease has been terminated and Steel Farms 
there tore has no right to purchase Croft & Reed's property. In any case, Section 19.9.4 
of the Lease "suspends" Steel Farm's right to the option when they are in default of the 
Lease - whether or not they received notice of default. 
Croft & Reed learned of Steel Farm's default on November 25,2008. Steel 
Farms recorded a Notice of Option (Notice) in the public record on December 3, 2008, 
even though they had no right to such option. This Notice should have been immediately 
removed when Steel Farms was notified of their default and termination oflease on 
December 29,2008. Nevertheless, Steel Farms not only failed to remove the Notice, they 
took no action to address the Lease violations. Moreover, they took the additional step of 
initiating this action against Croft & Reed knowing full well of their violations of the 
Lease and cancelled option rights. 
Whether or not Steel Farms believes that a cancellation of the option is "fair" or 
warranted, the terms of the Lease make it clear that they cannot exercise the option when 
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they are in default of the Lease. Pursuant to long standing principles of contract law, and 
assuming Steel Farm's position that the Lease is valid, the terms of the contract 
preventing the exercise of the option should and must be enforced. Steiner Investments v. 
Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002), World Wide Lease, Inc. v. 
Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986). Given the strong and compelling evidence 
of the unlawful activities and Lease violations occurring on the property, there is no 
material dispute over whether Steel Farms was in default of that Lease and therefore are 
prohibited from exercising the option. Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 
(Idaho 1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 
115 Idaho 101, 102 (Idaho 1988). 
V. Steel Farms' violations of the Lease have damaged Croft & Reed. 
Steel Farm's recording of the Notice and its subsequent actions have damaged 
Croft & Reed, and slandered the title to its property. Croft & Reed has been unable to 
proceed with the marketing of the property. Croft & Reed has also been unable to lease 
the property because of the cloud of uncertainty cause by Steel Farms. 
Moreover, Steel Farms is liable for its breach of contract, i.e. via the unlawful 
activities and environmental harms. Such breaches may have devalued the property and 
will result in significant clean up and repair costs. Croft & Reed is entitled to damages, 
the amount to be determined in a later proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the aforementioned facts and law, which are not in dispute, Croft & 
Reed's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. Steel Farms' Notice should be 
removed and Steel Farms should be held liable for damages caused by its breach of 
contract and slander of Croft & Reed's title. 
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